FT24012: AI as a Nihilism Bank

    Understanding in the days of old consisted of things read for us. These things drew attention to our ability to recognize them revealing an inner world of ourselves and our rationality. Aristotle was a good example of this method. Heidegger nuanced it with a Faustian twist. Underneath what we observe is a hidden layer that reveals us a truer understanding. This means to recognize true objects we have to be specialists and see the atoms at play or the stats behind something that first appears random. 

    In this pursuit we want to make a super intellect with our computers. This new intellect does not see things as things but grids of normalized numbers. This is the atomized intellect that corresponds with this new rationality which is not mediated by concepts like our human understanding is. In order for us to understand it we have to then link it to a known concept we do recognize. 

    This new intellect doesn't do what Heidegger says we do, reveal. We don't know what it is doing and we cannot interpret it conceptually and it doesn't map to our experience. As we do this we further isolate this process of revealing what is hidden to something that is more like that hidden. We could could see thinking moving towards this creation and then reverting back to a more human centered way of thought letting this process of truth we cannot see maintain the knowledge of the truth we cannot see. 

    The culmination of this project has been at the expense of our sense of meaning. Nihilism has been a noticeable part of culture because our values may obscure or dim perception of what is hidden. Nietzsche was sure this project of seeing hidden things in a cascade of hidden things a source of weakness in our psyche. He was stumped as how to overcome this vaguely referencing some Buddhist like methodology that needs to be translated to western thought.

    Maybe a more realistic way is we create a machine to be nihilistic better than we can. Humans often think in terms of reaching completion like Aristotle does in his teleological thinking. When something is more complete than we can be we don't gravitate towards it. We take conceptual thinking and rationality as a goal in many ways because we only see it in humanity. Humanity has not always emphasized nihilism and we may accept computer do a better job of it than ourselves freeing ourselves back to our more qualitative and conceptual origins as thinkers.

FT24005: Will and Anger

    Ressentiment for Nietzsche combines the lust for revenge that never gets satisfied. This is unhealthy and disfigures a soul that is consumed by it. He doesn't discard revenge in totality but advocates that the strong willed exact revenge in a way that satisfies an insult. He often connects this with an old world cultures that appear in pre-christianity to show how the modern man is developing into a pathetic set of thoughts.

    Yet, writings from this old world do not always agree with this. Old writers emphasize the toll anger exacts on us. Servants and slaves cause rumination on this topic. Nietzsche mandates that this period is categorized by the strong dominating the weak. These old writers would fit this category in that they are masters over people with less status fully subjected to the Nietzschian will to power. What happens is these servants perform tasks poorly and in their position they can exact any punishment that they see fit. Writers like Plutarch caution against this from the stand point of what becomes of you as you act in rage.

    All these annoyances sum up and Plutarch responds with a common motif of ethical thinking from the period. He asks us to look at people that have obvious problems with rage and how we react to them. We see these people as out of control and by their habits lose themselves to their emotions. Plutarch admits it's better to let people squander on trivial tasks like failing to remember buying bread for dinner than distort yourself in anger in punishing it. 

    Another writer of these times--Seneca--also has a similar conclusion. Instead of conjuring an instance of someone else, he has us imagine what our faces look like in the mist of rage reflected in a mirror. Our sober self would cringe at the sight. The transformation of our selves in this way is a clear indication of lack of virtue. This virtue is not some decree by the will to power as Nietzsche genealogizes morality to be but some fundamental recognition of stability. 

    Here there is a conflict. Nietzsche has morality be this code that is arbitrarily imposed by those who rule. He uses the past to justify the violence we see in this time but it is also the time which virtue ethics culminated. True, he does acknowledge Aristotle but only to undermine him and show his ethics is just a cloaked version of the will to power. These ancient thinkers had more cultural lee way in how they treated others yet they did notice that behavior--even if allowed--causes a disfigurement just as much as the ressentiment of Nietzsche.

FT24004: The Will in the Present

     The will is located in the present. It is not an integral part of our history and it isn't clear what the future holds. The will is a fundamental part of an individual and exist at the same time as we think. Our present does not stay the same and our will is fundamentally different in different parts of our life. Our actions are provoked by our will and commands us to focus on certain things rather than others.

    Philosophers attribute certain qualities to the will and what motivates it--re: Nietzsche et al. These qualities seem to exist prior to any formation by experience and experience can even tarnish the will. Yet we also see the will develop in philosophies like Hegel. We experience as we will and this experience we have to understand and see how it fits with our willing. Hegel has a passage contrasting the will of the heart vs. the will of the world which focuses us on how we actively have to measure our will with reality.

    This constant reoccurring projection of our will into the present has an iterative nature and each present vanishes into another present. If there were no source of change each present would be the same present much like some coral in a the sea staying the same until it dies. Defining the self as the will is problematic in that it doesn't account for why this will changes and why we choose to disregard our will much like how Hobbes defines the our contract in society. 

    With our experiences, we filter these presents differently even if there is no fundamental change in what we will. There has to be some connectivity with the past that forms our present--even if the present us is what is most real meaning what we exist in. The shaping process of our intellect is very much the accumulation of past experiences. The past shape is also a limited shape and this contrasts with present which opens itself to many possibilities. The present using the past shape to slightly nudge the past shape is a part the will plays in but does not define a person fully.

    The will as a thing separate from anything else cannot be subject to ethics. Alone it has no account for where it has been and where it needs to go. We can account for this because the will is integrated into how we think and our memory of the past. Even though our wills are important in our existence in the present it is not what makes us ourselves.

FT24002: The Will and Nihilism

    The will is central in many philosophies as it is a locus of our self particularly in the present. Many try to ascribe an innate character to the will. For Nietzsche it is the will to power and for Schopenhauer it is the will to procreate. These philosophies of the will also describe the denaturing of the will as a form of nihilism. Remarkably, one can go on with a denatured will, but in shadowy way that ethically blocks the person from reaching an eudaimonic conclusion. 

    Schopenhauer and Nietzsche also see Christianity as flipping of the will. For Nietzsche, loving each person equally hinders the will to power over others. Schopenhauer also sees a flipping Christianity in terms of chastity. This chastity flips the procreative element of the will and shows a will that wants to end life.

    A more recent philosopher, Foucault, also see an important element of the sexual life but in a way that makes a person more radical and differentiates into an individual. He does not agree with Schopenhauer that this is a reduction of the will but the will itself. Foucault's views on sexuality have little to do with causing life. To this end it is interesting that the chastity of Christianity and the abundance of sex with Foucault are related in what philosophers of the will report as nihilism in Schopenhauer's system. 

    However in these cases, the will's temporal nature does not describe a person from birth to death. One's will is often a small slice of someone's life that is under continual flux. The ideas of Aristotle have a broader out look where Society is a container of all our wills past and present. In the Aristotelian view we have to moderate our wills to fit into our society so that at the end of our careers we can achieve our goals while being in good repute with our neighbors. 

    Individualistic philosophers tend to see nihilism as a denatured will that an individual recognizes as insufficient while a societal view of ethics puts society as the judge of the will. If society judges one's will, it is possible for an individual to will but not recognize the quality of their will. An individual that is judging the quality of their will doesn't look to society for approval and many ways sees society as an obstacle in their willing.